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Insurance
By RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD'
INTRODUCTION
Kentucky courts have recently decided a number of cases
that have a significant impact on insurance law. Several deci-
sions dealt with the assertion of rights at variance with contract
provisions and the degree to which the law will recognize the
reasonable expectations of the insured. The courts also con-
sidered novel questions concerning cancellation by substitution,
the application and validity of various exclusions in homeowners
and automobile liability policies, the application and validity of
the escape clause in automobile liability policies, and the stack-
ing of automobile liability coverages. This Survey will examine
those questions, as well as the growing body of law relating to the
application and construction of the Kentucky Motor Vehicle Re-
parations Act (MVRA).1
I. THE CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT
A. Rights at Variance with Contract Provisions
Insurance contracts often pose traps for the unwary. In the
preface to a new student text on insurance, Professor John F.
Dobbyn opines: "[Clases in Insurance Law frequently read like a
chapter out of Alice in Wonderland ... [T]he contract (policy
of insurance) is only one [factor] that work[s] to swing a decision
either to the insured or the insurer." 2
A growing body of judicial opinions and legislation regulat-
ing the insurance industry reflects several underlying principles
" Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S. 1969, Ohio State Univer-
sity; J.D. 1976, Ohio State University.
I This Survey uses the format followed in the two previous Surveys of Kentucky in-
surance law, Savage, Kentucky Law Survey-Insurance, 66 KY. L.J. 631 (1977-78), and
Straub, Kentucky Law Survey-Insurance, 68 KY. L.J. 587 (1979-80).
2 j. DOBBYN, INSuTANCE LAW IN A NutSHELL xix (1981).
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regarding the assertion of rights at variance with policy provi-
sions. These equitable principles turn the usual meaning of con-
tract clauses into something quite unexpected, and the insured
and insurer, like Alice, may find that things are not always as
they seem. The first principle would deny an insurer unconscion-
able advantages resulting from the insurer's superior bargaining
position.3 The second would honor the reasonable expectations 6f
the applicant.4 These two principles are related to a third: re-
dress ought to be provided to the insured for detrimental reliance
on the action or inaction of the insurer. 5 Several recent Kentucky
cases are consistent with the application of these principles, al-
though recognition of these doctrines has not always been can-
didly expressed.
In Anderson v. Zurich Insurance Co., 6 the insured applied to
Zurich, through an independent agent, for broad form insurance
coverage for his construction equipment. Without the applicant's
knowledge or consent, Zurich's underwriter changed the appli-
cation to one for specific perils coverage, and a specific perils pol-
icy was issued. Two siubsequent losses were rejected by Zurich as
being outside the policy coverage, whereupon the insured filed
an action to reform the policy to provide for the broader cover-
age requested in the original application.
The trial court granted reformation, but the Court of Ap-
peals of Kentucky reversed and remanded, concluding that refor-
mation could be granted only if there was a mutual mistake in in-
tegrationAr The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, relying on
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 304.14-090 which
statesin pertinent part:
(1) Any application for insurance in writing by the appli-
cant shall be altered solely by the applicant or by his written
consent ....
(3) An insurer issuing a policy upon an application which
has been unlawfully altered by its officer, employe, or agent
3 R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAw-BASIc TEXT 341(1971).4 Id. at 342.5 Id.
6 614 S.W.2d 246 (Ky. 1980).7 Id. at 247.
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shall not have available in any action arising out of such pol-
icy, any defense based upon the fact of such alteration, or as to
any item which was so altered.
The Court in Anderson concluded that this statute stripped the
insurer of any defense based upon the restricted specific perils
coverage of the policy that was actually issued. 8
Whether the customer applies for insurance through a
broker, 9 a soliciting agent, 0 or a general agent of the insurer, he
or she ought to be permitted to expect that the policy that issues
will conform to what was requested in the application, absent
notice to the contrary. If the insurer is on notice of the applicant's
desired coverage and deliberately or negligently issues a policy
that differs from the one for which application was made, with-
out notice to the insured, then the insurer should bear any loss at-
tributable to a lack of coverage." Moreover, the insured's failure
to read the policy should not preclude the remedy of refor-
mation.1 2 Although there was no mutual mistake in Anderson,13
the denial of coverage on the facts of that case would have
amounted to a constructive fraud. The Court did not express its
holding in these terms, but reformation fulfilled the insured's
reasonable expectations and redressed a loss that otherwise
would have fallen on him due to his detrimental reliance. The in-
sured in Anderson assumed, quite naturally, that the insurer
would provide the requested coverage or notify him of the re-
8 Id. One could argue that the statute was enacted for a more limited purpose: to
eliminate the misrepresentation defense when the insurer's agent is responsible for false
answers in the application.
9 A broker is the agent of the insured. In at least one case, a demand for reformation
was denied on the ground that the broker's assurances of coverage could not be attributed
to the insurer, and on the additional ground that the applicant is obliged to read the policy
upon receipt. Watson v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 427 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir.
1970).
10 A soliciting agent does not have the power to bind coverage, and more than one
court has refused to impute the errors or representations of such an agent to the insurer for
the purpose of reformation in the absence of ratification. 13A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 7609 n.25 (1976).
11 Stamps v. Consolidated Underwriters, 468 P.2d 84 (Kan. 1970).
12 13A J. APPLEmAN, supra note 10, at § 7610 n.51. Contra id. at § 7610 n.48.35.
13 The Court did not specifically address the issue of whether there was a mutual
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duced coverage of the policy that issued. The Court relied on the
language of KRS section 304.14-090 subsections (1) and (3) to
reach an equitable result, but it could have decided the case on
the broader grounds of detrimental reliance and reasonable ex-
pectations.
The same currents can be identified in Continental Casualty
Co. v. Smith.14 In that case, Milton and Cora Smith operated a
floral shop out of their residence. They applied for personal dis-
ability income protection under their trade association's group
policy with Continental. They were induced to apply for the pol-
icy by advertisements and materials provided by Continental. No
agent or salesperson called upon them. Cora applied for a $1,000
monthly benefit plan, and in so doing answered the following
question in the negative: "Does the indemnity for loss of time
herein applied for together with all other income protection pol-
icies you have or are applying for exceed 75% of your wage or
salary[?]"
After the approval of the application, Cora suffered a disabl-
ing accident, and collected $1,000 per month for the next thir-
teen months, during which time Continental continued to accept
premiums despite the policy's waiver of premium provision.
More than a year after the accident, Continental demanded a re-
turn of all benefits previously paid on the ground that the bene-
fits Cora had requested exceeded seventy-five percent of her
wage or salary. No member of the family business was paid a
wage or salary; instead, they lived from the income of the bus-
iness, which was what they thought they had insured.
The Smiths brought an action against Continental demand-
ing that the policy benefits be made current and continue for the
duration of her disability. Although the jury agreed with the in-
surer that Cora's answer on the application was substantially un-
true and that the insurer would not have accepted the applica-
tion had Cora answered the question affirmatively, it nonethe-
less rejected the misrepresentation defense.15 The court of appeals
mistake as to the coverage of the policy, but it appears that the insurer never intended to
provide broad form insurance, thus denying the insured reformation on that theory.
14 617 S.W.2d 48, 49 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
15 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-110 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981) [hereinafter cited as
KRS] which provides:
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affirmed a judgment for the insureds on the basis that the promo-
tional material was ambiguous and induced the Smiths' reason-
able belief that the income of the business was insured rather
than Cora's individual wage or salary.16 The court of appeals
concluded that the pamphlets and fliers supplied by Continental
became part of the policy, stating: "To hold otherwise 'would be
sustaining a [constructive] fraud that no court of conscience
could sanction.""17
The court found support for its decision in earlier cases in
which the insurer was estopped from making the misrepresenta-
tion defense when the insured, through ignorance or good faith,
was misled by the company's agent into believing his or her an-
swers were truthful. 8 The court of appeals went further, how-
ever, and clearly recognized the insured's right at variance with
the policy provisions by taking into account reasonable expecta-
tions and detrimental reliance upon marketing devices selected
by the carrier.19
Not every expectation of the insured will be fulfilled, how-
ever. In Flowers v. Wells,20 the insureds alleged that they had re-
quested full coverage, although their agent testified later that
they had asked for "the cheapest thing they could get by with."2'
Misrepresentations, omissions and incorrect statements shall not prevent a re-
covery under the policy or contract unless either:
(1) Fraudulent; or
(2) Material either to the acceptance of the risk, or to the hazard assumed by the
insurer; or
(3) The insurer in good faith would... not have issued the policy ....
16 Continental Cas. Co. v. Smith, 617 S.W.2d at 50. The court of appeals also
properly rejected the insurer's argument that Kentucky's entire contract statute, KRS §
304.14-180 (1981), precluded reliance on the insurer's promotional materials. Id. Such sta-
tutes were enacted in many states in response to the device of incorporation by reference,
which was used by some companies to include the insurer's bylaws (which the insured
never saw) and other conditions in the policy of insurance. W. YouNG, CASES AND MATER-
IALS ON INSURANCE 123 n.9, 264 (1971).
17 617 S.W.2d at 51 (citing Southern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Montague, 2 S.W. 443
(Ky. 1887)).
18 Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co. v. McReynolds, 440 S.W.2d 275 (Ky. 1969); Sovereign
Camp v. Alcock, 117 S.W.2d 938 (Ky. 1938).
,9 Cf. Fritz v. Old Am. Ins. Co., 354 F. Supp. 514 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (illustrating how
the use of the mail as a marketing device can affect the rights of the insurer and insured).
20 602 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
21 Id. at 180.
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The insureds were injured in an automobile accident, and the re-
sponsible driver's insurance was insufficient to cover all their
damages. They sued their own insurer, State Farm, claiming
that the policy should have provided underinsured motorist
coverage pursuant to their request for full coverage. To bolster
their argument, they claimed that such coverage was mandatory
under KRS section 304.39-320, which requires underinsured
motorist coverage to be made "available upon request." In af-
firming a summary judgment for the insurer, the court of appeals
concluded that underinsured motorist coverage is optional and
need be furnished only upon request, and that a request for full
coverage could not be construed as a request for such optional
coverage. u
B. Cancellation by Substitution
The court of appeals addressed a novel question concerning
the cancellation of a binder in Potomac Insurance Co. v. Motor-
ist Mutual Insurance Co.2 According to the majority rule, the
mere procuring of substitute insurance with an intent to replace
an existing permanent policy, but without an intent to acquire
additional insurance, does not cancel the existing policy.Y But
what if the existing insurance was procured in the form of a
binder which, by definition, is a temporary contract of insurance
providing immediate coverage until a permanent policy can be
obtained?
In Potomac, the insureds were partners in a sporting goods
business. They obtained a builder's risk policy covering a new
building during its construction. When the building was com-
pleted, they obtained a binder from Potomac insuring the build-
ing and its contents while they solicited bids for a permanent pol-
icy. Motorist Mutual's bid for a permanent policy was accepted,
and an application for that policy was approved on December
first. The building was destroyed by fire on December four-
2 Id.
23 598 S.W.2d461 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
24 See, e.g., Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Founders' Ins. Co., 25 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1962). But
see KRS § 304.20-040(5) (b) (1981) (cancellation of automobile policies).
[Vol. 70
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teenth, before the insureds were notified of Motorist Mutual's ap-
proval of their application. Motorist Mutual demanded that
Potomac pay half of the loss, but Potomac balked, relying on the
doctrine of cancellation by substitution. The trial court rejected
the doctrine and entered a summary judgment for Motorist Mu-
tual. The court of appeals reversed, noting that the owners did
not intend to have duplicate coverage, and the binder, a tempo-
rary contract of insurance, was intended as a stop-gap measure.25
Therefore, the court concluded that the doctrine of cancellation
by substitution applied in this narrow class of cases. The binder
expired upon the issuance of the permanent policy.25
C. Policy Exclusions
1. Intentional Acts
Liability and homeowners frequently contain an ex-
clusion which provides that the policy will not apply to cover
bodily injury or property damage which is either expected or in-
tended from the standpoint of the insured.27 Some courts have
labored mightily to interpret these exclusions in such a way as to
make the policy proceeds available to a third party claimant, and
decisions interpreting the exclusion are of considerable impor-
tance to the plaintiffs bar. An example of a strict interpretation
of such clauses includes a recent Florida case2s which arose from
a family quarrel in which X, a participant in the quarrel, in-.
tended to shoot Y, but hit a passerby. The court construed the
provision of X's homeowners policy, which excluded coverage for
bodily injuries that were either expected or intended by the in-
sured, as applying only where the wrongful act is "intentionally
25 Potomac Ins. Co. v. Motorist Mut. Ins. Co., 598 S.W.2d at 463.
2 Id. The court did not discuss the niceties of whether the permanent policy had is-
sued and become effective prior to policy delivery, and Motorist Mutual appears to have
conceded the point. Accordingly, the court found some additional support for its position
in KRS § 304.14-220(2) (1981), which provides: "No binder shall be valid beyond the insu-
ance of the policy with rspect to which it was given, or beyond ninety (90) days from its
effective date, whichever period is the shorter."
27 See generally Bardenwerper, Intentional Act an "Occurrence" Under the CGL
Policy, 18 FoR THE DEFENSE 166 (1977).
28 Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Thomas, 301 So. 2d 158 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
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directed specifically toward the person injured by such act."' 9
Another example of the minority approach involves an Ohio
case. ° An insured driver saw her boyfriend standing on the
corner lost in conversation with another woman. The insured at-
tempted to run down her rival but instead struck a bystander.
Her insurer was compelled to compensate the victim because the
insured did not have the specific intent to cause the particular in-
jury that was suffered.3'
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky decision in Willis v. Ham-
ilton Mutual Insurance Co.32 suggests that a different interpreta-
tion of exclusionary clauses will be made if a similar case arises in
the Commonwealth. In that case, the court rejected the minor-
ity, or specific intent rule, and adopted the majority approach
which excludes coverage if the insured intended the act and it
caused some kind of bodily injury. The court ruled that "[intent
may be actual or inferred by the nature of the act and the accom-
panying reasonable foreseeability of harm,"-' and held that it is
"immaterial that the actual harm caused is of a different charac-
ter or magnitude than that intended."' The case did not deal
with an unintended victim, but the application of the majority
rule adopted in Willis would bar recovery in such a case. Al-
though the specific intent rule has the virtue of insuring that tort
victims will be compensated from some source, the construction
of the exclusionary clause adopted in Willis does more justice to
the language and purpose of the standard exclusion.
2. The Household Exclusion
A generation of personal injury lawyers has been vexed by
the household exclusion in the standard automobile liability pol-
icy. This exclusion usually takes the following form: "This insur-
ance does not apply under (i) Coverage A, to bodily injury to the
insured or any member of the family of the insured residing in
29 Id. at 159.
30 Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Mosley, 322 N.E.2d 693 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974).
31 Id. at 696.
32 614 S.W.2d 251 (Ky. Ct. App.), discretionary rev. denied, 617 S.W.2d 393 (Ky.
1981).
W Id. at 252.34 Id.
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the same household as the insured."'
It is often said that the purpose of the household exclusion is
to protect the insurer from the moral hazard of collusion between
members of the same household,e but it has led to some surpris-
ing results when coupled with the standard omnibus clause. Such
clauses typically define the insured as including: "(1) the named
insured... [and] (4) any other person while using the owned
automobile, provided the operation and the actual use of such
automobile are with the permission of the named in-
sured . ... "-1
The combination of these clauses poses an intriguing question
when the named insured is a passenger in his or her own vehicle
and is injured due to the negligence of an unrelated omnibus in-
sured: May the named insured recover from his or her own in-
surer?
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky applied the household ex-
clusion in Withers v. Meridian Mutual Insurance Co., 3 a case in
which both the named insured and her permittee, the omnibus
insured, were killed and therefore hardly in a position to partic-
ipate in collusive litigation. The court was persuaded by the in-
surer's arguments that the household exclusion serves legitimate
purposes aside from protecting the insurer from collusive suits
between members of the same household.39 First, if the exclusion
were not applied, the insurer would find itself defending the
named insured's permittee under the omnibus clause while resist-
ing the named insured's claim, although the company and the
named insured had agreed that she would have no such claim. 4°
Second, an automobile liability policy is intended to provide the
insured with protection from the claims of third parties.41 To al-
35 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Xaphes, 384 F.2d 640, 641 (2d Cir. 1967) (cit-
Ing the household exclusion clause in a State Farm policy).
1 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Oliver, 406 F.2d 409, 410 (6th Cir.
1969); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 522 S.W.2d 184, 186
(Ky. Ct. App. 1975).
37 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Xaphes, 384 F.2d at 641 (citing an omnibus
clause in a State Farm policy).
-8 626 S.W.2d 214 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) discretionary rev. denied, 609 S.W.2d 366
(Ky. 1980).
39 Id. at 215.
40 Id.
41 Id.
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low the named insured to recover from its liability insurer not-
withstanding the household exclusion would convert the automo-
ble liability policy into a first party policy for accident and death
benefits. 42
The Withers case is within the mainstream of current deci-
sions, 43 but it did not deal with the potential conflict between the
household exclusion and the Commonwealth's compulsory insur-
ance law, the Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations Act
(MVRA).44 The issue was ultimately presented to the Kentucky
Supreme Court in Bishop v. Allstate Insurance Co.4 Ruth Ann
Bishop was injured in a single-car accident in which she was the
sole passenger in an automobile driven by her husband. At the
time of the accident, Mr. Bishop had an automobile liability pol-
icy with Allstate that contained a household exclusion. In an ac-
tion by the Bishops against Allstate, the trial court granted the
insurer's motion for judgment on the pleadings based upon the
exclusion.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court and rejected the
Bishops' contention that the exclusion conflicted with the man-
datory insurance provisions of the MVRA. The court reasoned
that (1) the exclusion did not affect the availability of basic
reparation benefits (BRB); (2) the effect and validity of the
household exclusion were known to the legislature when it
adopted the MVRA in 1974; and (3) the commissioner of insur-
ance had approved the form of contract pursuant to KRS section
304.39-150.41 The Supreme Court reversed. The late Justice Lu-
kowsky, writing for the Court, reasoned that the MVRA, by its
very terms, established a system of compulsory insurance requir-
ing owners, registrants and operators of motor vehicles to pro-
cure insurance with a minimum coverage for tort liability of
$10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident for personal in-
juries, in addition to BRB.47 The Court also stated that both the
Kentucky legislature and the drafters of the Uniform Motor
4 2 Id. at 216-17.
43 See 12 COUCH ON INSURANCE §§ 45:484,45:486 (2d ed. 1964).
44 KRS §§ 304.39-010 to -340 (1981).
45 623 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1981).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 865-66.
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Vehicle Accident Reparations Act, upon which the MVRA was
patterned, knew how to provide for exceptions to the minimum
coverages relative to BRB and tort liability.4 Since the legislature
did not explicitly provide for exceptions, the Court presumed
that it did not intend that "the minimum tort liability coverage
be diluted or eliminated by any exceptions or exclusions. " 49 When
the legislature set forth the policy behind the MVRA and its min-
imum requirements, it specified, and therefore permitted, no ex-
clusions from the minimum coverageA0 The Court's earlier cases
upholding the validity of a household exclusion were overruled
by Bishop to the extent that those decisions allowed the exclusion
to eliminate the minimum coverage required by the MVRA.
D. The Non-Standard Escape Clause
Insurers have attempted to avoid the moral hazard associated
with overinsurance and cumulative coverages by inserting
various forms of "other insurance" clauses in their policies. 51
These clauses eliminate or reduce the coverage otherwise pro-
vided by the policy if the insured has obtained another policy on
the same risk, or if another policy applies for some other reason.
Frequently, the "other insurance" clauses of two policies will
conflict, presenting the trial judge with a circuitous question of
contract construction.
In Royal-Globe Insurance Co. v. Safeco Insurance Co., 52 the
481d. at 866. The Kentucky legislature did not adopt sections 12, 14 and 15 of the
uniform act which provided that BRB may be subject to certain exclusions. Moreover,
neither the uniform act nor the MVRA includes provisions permitting exclusions to the
minimum tort liability. Id. In Couty v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 608
S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1980), the Court held that the legislature did not allow for any excep-
tions to the minimum BRB coverage. See the text accompanying notes 83-89 infra for a
discussion of Couty.
49 Bishop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 623 S.W.2d at 866.
M Id. Justice Lukowsky also relied upon a Michigan decision, Allstate Ins. Co. v.
DeFrain, 265 N.W.2d 392 (Mich. 1978).
51 Such clauses come in one of two forms, the "excess clause" and the "escape
clause." A typical excess clause provides: "the insurance ... shall be excess over other col-
lectible insurance." A typical escape clause provides: "but only if no other valid and collec-
tible automobile liability insurance, either primary or excess... is available to such per-
son." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Home Indem. Ins. Co., 261 N.E.2d 128, 129
(Ohio 1970) (citing a State Farm policy).
52 560 S.W.2d 22 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
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insured had a policy with Safeco insuring her "owned automo-
bile" and any "temporary substitute automobile." The policy
contained an excess clause that made the policy coverage into ex-
cess insurance with respect to any temporary substitute automo-
bile. The owner's car was damaged in an accident, and she took
it to a garageman, who provided her with a temporary substitute
vehicle insured under a garage liability policy with Royal-Globe.
The garageman procured the insurance policy in order to comply
with KRS section 190.033, which provides:
The bond or policy shall provide public liability and property
damage coverage for the operation of any vehicle owned or be-
ing offered for sale by the said dealer or wholesaler when being
operated by the owner or seller, his agents, servants, employes,
prospective customers or other persons. The amount of said in-
surance shall be ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for bodily in-
jury or death of any one person; and twenty thousand dollars
($20,000) for bodily injury or death in any one accident; and
five thousand dollars ($5,000) property damage.
The Royal-Globe policy contained an escape clause that pro-
vided: "If there is other valid and collectible insurance whether
primary, excess or contingent, available to the garage customer
and the limits of such insurance are sufficient to pay damages up
to the amount of the applicable financial responsibility limit, no
damages are collectible under this policy."53
The owner's temporary substitute automobile was involved
in an accident while driven by her permittee, Wickly, an omni-
bus insured under both the Safeco and Royal-Globe policies.4
The two insurers litigated their respective liabilities in a declara-
tory judgment action, in which Safeco argued that the escape
clause was in conflict with the minimum requirements of KRS
section 190.033. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky upheld the
validity of the escape clause, giving it priority over the excess
clause in the Safeco policy. The court reasoned that the compul-
sory garage liability insurance provision in KRS section 190.033
was intended to protect members of the public, not insurers, and
53 Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
54 See the text accompanying note 37 supra for an example of an omnibus clause.
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noted that "[w]hen the controversy is between two insurers, the
liability for a loss should be determined by the terms and provi-
sions of the respective policies without regard to the rights in-
jured third parties might assert under a compulsory insurance
law."- The opinion did not speak directly to the validity of the
escape clause when the dispute was between an insurance com-
pany and a member of the public-the tort claimant who might
otherwise suffer injury at the hands of an uninsured motorist.
The latter question was presented in Universal Underwriters
Insurance Co. v. Veljkovic. 5 Veljkovic was driving a temporary
substitute automobile supplied by White Chevrolet-Pontiac
when she was involved in a collision with a second vehicle occu-
pied by Owens. Owens was killed, and his administratrix
brought a wrongful death action against Veljkovic. Veljkovic
had a policy with Kentucky Farm Bureau which provided only
excess coverage in the case of an accident involving a temporary
substitute automobile. White Chevrolet-Pontiac's garage liabil-
ity policy with Universal Underwriters provided umbrella cover-
age of $1 million, but it contained a non-standard escape clause
which included among "[plersons [i]nsured" "any other person
while actually using an AUTOMOBILE covered by this coverage
part with the permission of the NAMED INSURED, provided,
that such person (a) has no automobile liability insurance of his
(her) own, either primary or excess."
Both insurers refused to defend Veljkovic and she filed a
third-party complaint against them in which she sought to estab-
lish their duty to defend and indemnify her for any judgment in
the Owens case. The trial court held that the escape clause in the
garage's policy with Universal violated the public policy reflected
in KRS section 190.033 and required Universal to provide
primary coverage under the $1 million umbrella policy. The
court of appeals upheld this portion of the trial court's judgment
and distinguished the case from Royal-Globe on the ground that
Royal-Globe only involved a suit between rival insurance com-
5 Royal-Globe Ins. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 560 S.W.2d at 24-25. An escape clause
prevails over an excess clause. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Globe Indem. Co., 415
S.W.2d 581 (Ky. 1967). If both policies contain an escape clause, liability will be pro-
rated. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 511 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1974).
0 613 S.W.2d 426 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
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panies.57 On the other hand, it reversed the judgment of the trial
court with respect to the amount of coverage Universal was obli-
gated to provide. The public policy expressed in the statutory re-
quirement of a minimum coverage of $10,000 per person inval-
idated the escape clause only to the extent that Universal would
be required to provide the minimum coverage.-
E. Stacking
In Butler v. Robinette,59 the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled
on the validity of a policy provision prohibiting stacking of liabil-
ity insurance policies. The facts of the case were not in dispute.
Flossie Robinette was injured when her car was struck by a 1965
Chevrolet owned by Mason Butler and driven by his son, Donald
Butler. Donald's negligence was the sole cause of the accident.
What complicated the case was the fact that four separate pol-
icies were arguably involved. Donald owned two cars that were
not involved in the accident. Both were insured with Kentucky
Farm Bureau, but under separate policies for which Donald paid
separate premiums. Each policy had a $10,000 limit per person.
Mason Butler had insured the automobile that was involved in
the accident, as well as his pickup, with separate policies identi-
cal to Donald's, for which Mason paid separate premiums. Both
of Mason's policies were also with Kentucky Farm Bureau. Ken-
tucky Farm Bureau agreed to pay $10,000 on behalf of Mason
Butler under the policy covering the 1965 Chevrolet, $10,000 un-
der Donald's policy on one of his automobiles, and an additional
$10,000 on the other two policies if and only if it was judicially
determined that the coverage of those policies could be stacked or
pyramided. Each policy contained the following provision:
If coverage under more than one policy issued by the Company
is applicable to any one accident for the benefit of an insured,
the total liability of the Company, under this Division and like
Divisions of other policies with this Company, shall not be in-
creased beyond the limits of liability stated in the declaration
57 Id. at 426 n.1.
58 Id.
59 614 S.W.2d 944 (Ky. 1981).
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of the policy of this Company which affords the maximum ap-
plicable limits of liability, irrespective of the number of pol-
icies in this Company which may be applicable to such loss.
The trial court determined that the plaintiff could not re-
cover under the terms of Mason Butler's policy covering the pick-
up, but permitted the stacking of the other three policies. The
court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that policy provisions pro-
hibiting stacking were in conflict with the Financial Responsibil-
ity Law in effect at the time of the accident.60 The Kentucky Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals had
erred in construing the law as mandating that each policy on
each vehicle provide a minimum amount of insurance. The
Court noted that sections (9) and (10) of the statute permitted an
insurer to limit its liability and prorate its coverage, as long as the
total amount from all policies equalled the minimum amount of
insurance required by the statute. 6' This now repealed statute is
in sharp contrast to KRS section 304.20-020 (formerly KRS sec-
tion 304.682(1)) which requires that each policy provide min-
imum benefits and therefore mandates the stacking of uninsured
motorist benefits.6 2 Stacking may otherwise be prohibited by an
exclusion in the automobile liability policy.
10 KRS § 187.490(2) (repealed by Act of Mar. 31, 1978, ch. 434, § 9, 1978 Ky. Acts
1934, 1934)) provided:
The owner's policy of liability insurance:
(a) Shall designate by explicit description or by appropriate reference all
motor vehicles with respect to which coverage is thereby to be granted; and
(b) Shall insure the person named therein and any other person, as in-
sured, using any such motor vehicle with the express or implied permission of
the named insured, against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the motor vehicle within the
United States of America or the Dominion of Canada, subject to limits exclusive
of interest and costs, with respect to each motor vehicle, as follows: Ten thou-
sand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one acci-
dent and, subject to the limit for one person, twenty thousand dollars because of
bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident, and five
thousand dollars because of injury to or destruction of property of others in any
one accident.
61 Butler v. Robinette, 614 S.W.2d at 947.62 See, e.g., Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Siddons, 451 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1970), noted in
Savage, supra note 1, at 632, and Straub, supra note 1, at 597. But see State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Short, 603 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (where insured was issued a policy
covering two vehicles, but the policy limited the insurer's liability for uninsured motorists
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II. MOTOR VEHICLE REPARATIONS ACT
Cases decided during the survey year relating to the interpre-
tation and construction of the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act
will be analyzed by organizing them according to their subject
matter.
A. Application-Operation or Use
A 1976 survey63 of the MVRA stated that one of the most con-
fusing aspects of the statute is whether a minor injured as a pe-
destrian will be subject to the limitation of tort rights set forth in
KRS section 304.39-060(1), which provides: "Any person who
registers, operates, maintains or uses a motor vehicle on the pub-
lic roadways of this Commonwealth shall, as a condition of such
registration... be deemed to have accepted [the limitation of
his or her tort rights]." A child does not own, operate, or main-
tain a motor vehicle. On the other hand, KRS section 304.39-
020(15) formerly defined "user" as "a person who is a basic
reparation insured or would be a basic reparation insured if such
person had not rejected the limitations upon his tort rights as pro-
vided in KRS section 304.39-060(4)." On account of this defini-
tion, the authors of the survey suggested that a minor would be a
user whose tort rights would be limited by the statute if the
minor were a basic reparation insured on his parents' policy", or
if the parents failed to reject the limitation on tort rights pur-
suant to KRS section 304.39-060(4).65
This reading of the statute was adopted by the Court of Ap-
peals of Kentucky in Lawrence v. Risen.66 In that case, Risen's
automobile struck a fifteen year old minor who was a passenger
on a bicycle. The victim's injuries were insufficient to satisfy the
threshold requirements of the MVRA,6 and when suit was filed,
coverage to $10,000 regardless of the number of automobiles insured under the policy,
there could be no stacking of $10,000 per vehicle).
63 Note, Kentucky No-Fault: An Analysis and Interpretation, 65 KY. L.J. 466 (1976-
77).
6 Id. at 495. The definition of a basic reparation insured includes minors in the cus-
tody of the named insured. KRS § 304.39-020(3) (1981).
65 Note, supra note 63, at 495.
6 598 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
67 See the text accompanying notes 130-53 infra for a discussion of the threshold re-
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the defendant moved for summary judgment. The plaintiff al-
leged that he was not a user and that his tort rights could not be
limited. The court of appeals affirmed a summary judgment for
the defendant. Since the minor's parents failed to reject no-fault
limitations,6s his tort rights were barred. 9 Citing the language of
KRS section 304.39-060(4), the court opined that the plaintiff
had been presented with the opportunity to establish that he was
a non-user by virtue of his parents being uninsured motorists. 70
The plaintiff failed to present such evidence in response to the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, and could not be
heard to suggest for the first time on appeal that a material issue
of fact existed concerning his status as a user.71
The definition of user was amended in 1978 to include any
"person who resides in a household in which any person owns or
maintains a motor vehicle." 72 This amendment should dispel any
confusion regarding the status of minors who are injured as pe-
destrians.
B. Coordination of Benefits
1. Survivor's Benefits
The MVRA provides a decedent's survivors73 with benefits for
any compensation (survivor's economic loss)74 or services (sur-
vivor's replacement services loss)75 the decedent would have pro-
vided them had he or she not died. In United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co. v. MeEnroe,76 the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled
quirements, which, if met, permit a tort action.
68 A rejection on behalf of one under a legal disability may be filed by a natural par-
ent or guardian within six months of the date upon which the statute becomes applicable
to him or her. KRS § 304.39-060(4) (1981).
69 Lawrencev. Risen, 598 S.W.2d at 475.
70 Id. Under the definition of user in KRS § 304.39-060(4), an uninsured motorist is a
nonuser, exempt from the MVRA. Dixon v. Cowles, 562 S.W.2d 639 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
71 Lawrence v. Risen, 598 S.W.2d at 475.
72 KRS § 304.39-020(15) (1981).
73 KRS § 304.39-020(14) (1981) defines survivor as a person identified in KRS §
411.130 (1981) (Kentucky's wrongful death statute).
7' KRS § 304.39-020(5)(d) (1981).
75 KRS § 304.39-020(5)(e) (1981).
76 610 S.W.2d 593 (Ky. 1980).
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that the administrator of an estate is not the real party in interest
to seek survivor's benefits under the MVRA. If an injury causes
death, payments made pursuant to the Act are limited to "sur-
vivor's economic loss" and "survivor's replacement service loss,"
and are payable only to those persons identified in KRS section
411.130, which does not include the decedent's estate. 7
In Howard v. Hamilton,78 the decedent's wife was appointed
administratrix of his estate. She contacted her husband's insurer,
Kentucky Farm Bureau, concerning the accident in which her
husband had been killed. At that time, it was agreed that she
would receive $1,000 for funeral expenses under the policy. She
also was paid $4,000 as a lump sum settlement for claimed sur-
vivor's economic loss and replacement services loss. Her children
then brought an action demanding that they receive one-half of
the sum she received. The court of appeals held that the dece-
dent's wife had dealt with the insurance company as an individ-
ual survivor rather than as a representative of other survivors. 79
Accordingly, she was entitled to keep the $4,000. That payment
did not prevent the children from demonstrating that they also
had suffered a survivor's economic loss or replacement services
loss, which would be paid from the $6,000 remaining in the in-
surer's fund.
It must be remembered that the MVRA does not provide a
$10,000 accidental death benefit payable to the survivors. The
particular survivor claiming the loss must have suffered an actual
and compensable loss. The difference between benefits recover-
able under the MVRA and damages recoverable under Ken-
tucky's wrongful death statute is illustrated by Aetna Insurance
Co. v. Thompson. 0 The deceased was a widower without chil-
dren at the time of his death at age eighty. His only heirs were an
elderly brother and sister who sought recovery of $7,688 for sur-
vivor's economic losses. The figure was computed by multiplying
77 Id. at 594. See also Gregory v. Allstate Ins. Co., 618 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. Ct. App.
1981) (benefits for work loss are not recoverable in a death case, and a personal representa-
tive cannot prosecute an action for such benefits).
78 612 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
79 Id. at 347.
80 27 Ky. L. SuMM. 9, at 10 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) [hereinafter cited as KLS], affd, 614
S.W.2d 537 (Ky. 1981) (unpublished).
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the deceased's social security benefits by his life expectancy. In
other words, the demand for relief was based upon the damages
sustained by the decedent's estate as if the action had been
brought pursuant to the wrongful death statute.81
The court of appeals rejected this measure of recovery. The
court held that in the absence of evidence that the decedent con-
tributed things of economic value to his brother and sister during
his lifetime (or would have done so), it could not be said that they
had lost any compensation as a result of his death since his death
did not cause them any survivor's economic loss.8-
Nonetheless, recovery for survivor's economic losses and sur-
vivor's replacement services losses is not limited to losses already
accrued. Nor is recovery limited to expenses which the survivor
has actually paid or become obligated to pay. In Couty v. Ken-
tucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 8s the Kentucky Su-
preme Court held that a survivor may recover not only expenses
the survivor had actually paid, but also an amount for the loss of
future services which it was reasonably probable the decedent
would have rendered to the survivor. 4 The Court noted that the
Kentucky legislature had omitted the words "survivor's economic
loss" and "survivor's replacement services loss" when it adopted
section 23(a) of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations
Act, which provides:
Basic and added reparation benefits are payable monthly as
loss accrues. Loss accrues not when injury occurs, but as work
loss, replacement services loss, survivor's economic loss, sur-
vivor's replacement services loss, or allowable expense is in-
curred....
Commissioner's Comment:
This Section describes what is intended to be customary
practice-paying basic reparation benefits monthly as loss ac-
81 KRS § 411.130 (1981). Recovery under the wrongful death statute is based upon
the amount the deceased would have accumulated during his or her lifetime "but for" his
or her death. Although the action was brought by the decedent's executrix in Thompson,
the insurance company did not press its challenge to her right to bring the action for the
benefit of the survivors on the appeal.
82 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 27 KLS 9, at 11.
83 608 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1980).84 Id.
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crues-contrasted to the customary practice of paying tort
claims in lump sum settlements or judgments."'
The Court concluded that the effect of these omissions was to ex-
clude such losses from the practice of paying benefits only as they
accrue each month.8 Put another way, the legislature intended
that death benefits be paid in a lump sum settlement or judg-
ment.
Under the MVRA, survivor's economic loss and survivor's re-
placement services loss accrue to the survivor only if a net loss is
established. Social security or worker's compensation benefits are
subtracted in calculating such net loss. 87 For example, in Amer-
ican States Insurance Co. v. Colville,88 no net survivor's eco-
nomic loss accrued to the deceased's infant son when the son's
economic loss of eighty dollars per month child support was more
than offset by social security benefits of $421 per month. The
court also ruled that in disputes involving a determination of sur-
vivor's economic loss, the jury should determine gross economic
loss, and the trial court should then determine the net economic
loss by subtracting any social security or worker's compensation
benefits from that amount. 89
2. Limitations
The MVRA sets forth a number of time limitations affecting
actions brought under the no-fault act. If no BRB payments have
yet been made for a personal injury, the injured person has two
years to file an action.1 The statute is triggered at the time the
loss is sustained or when the injured person knows or should have
known that the injury was caused by the accident, but in no
event more than four years after the accident. 91 If a BRB pay-
ment already has been made, an action for additional benefits
85 Uniform Motor Vehicle Reparations Act, § 23(a), & Commissioners Comment,
14 U.L.A. 95-97 (1980) (emphasis added).
86 Couty v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 608 S.W.2d at 371.
87 KRS § 304.39-120 (1981).
88 27 KLS 11, at 9 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), affd sub nom. Colville v. American States
Ins. Co., No. 80-SC-607-DG (Ky. Sept. 22, 1981) (unpublished).
89 Id.
go KRS § 304.39-230(1) (1981).
91 Id.
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must be brought within two years of the last payment. 92 If
neither the decedent nor the survivor has received BRB, an ac-
tion for survivor's benefits must be filed within one year after
death or four years after the accident, whichever comes first.9 If
either the decedent or survivor has received BRB, any action for
additional benefits must be filed within two years of the last pay-
ment.Y If the decedent received BRB prior to his or her death,
but the survivor has received no BRB, the survivor's action must
be filed within one year of the death or four years after the last
payment of BRB to the decedent, whichever comes first. 95
However, if a claimant has been injured in an automobile ac-
cident which would otherwise be subject to no-fault, but has
damages that exceed the thresholds of KRS section 304.39-
060(2), thereby making tort recovery possible, the claimant will
have two years to commence his or her action pursuant to KRS
section 304.39-230(6) .6 That statute provides: "An action for tort
liability not abolished by KRS 304.39-060 may be commenced
not later than two (2) years after the injury, or the death, or the
last basic or added reparation payment made by any reparation
obligor, whichever later occurs." Absent this statute, the injured
party's claim would be governed by the one year statute of lim-
itations provided by KRS section 413.140(1) which covers gen-
eral tort actions.
In Everman v. Miller,97 the plaintiff was injured in an auto-
mobile accident that occurred on May 20, 1975. The complaint
was filed sixteen months later. The trial court dismissed the com-
plaint pursuant to the general tort one year statute of limitations
set forth in KRS section 413.140. On appeal, the plaintiff-appel-
lant contended that KRS section 304.39-230(6), which had come
into effect July 1, 1975, had extended his filing deadline to May
21, 1977. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky held that the plain-
92 Id.
3KRS § 340.39-230(2) (1981).94 d.
95 Id.
9 Tucker v. Johnson, 619 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
17 597 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
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tiff was not entitled to claim benefits under the no-fault statute
since it applied prospectively. 98 The plaintiff could not claim the
benefit of the statute of limitations contained in the MVRA if he
could not claim any other benefit under the MVRA.11 Moreover,
the court held that KRS section 304.39-230(6) did not repeal the
general statute of limitations for tort actions.e0 The court stated
that the statute only abrogated the one year period of limitations
for personal injuries sustained in automobile accidents which
would be subject to no-fault were it not for KRS section 304.39-
060.101
Time limitations also were at issue in Gray v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.10 2 The court of appeals ad-
dressed the question of whether the two year statute of limita-
tions in KRS section 304.39-230 subsections (1) and (6) applies to
a basic reparations obligor who paid BRB, but who failed to
commence an action to recoup such payments within two years
from the date of its last payment. In a subrogation action
brought by State Farm, Gray and her insurance company, Ken-
tucky Farm Bureau, had been adjudged liable for BRB in the
amount of $9,640.41. This amount had been paid by State Farm
to the injured party.103 The accident occurred on December 18,
1975. The injured party filed the original tort action within two
years of the accident, but State Farm did not intervene until
more than two years had elapsed from the date of the accident
and from the date it had made its last BRB payment.
The court refused to apply the two year period of limitations
to bar State Farm's claim for subrogation. The court noted that
KRS section 304.39-070(2) provides that a reparation obligor is
subrogated to all of the rights of the injured party to the extent of
its obligation. 4 In addition, a reparation obligor may assert a
claim for benefits paid by joining as a party in any action com-
98 Id. at 154.
99 Id. at 155.
100 Id.
101 See Note, supra note.63, at 510 (raising, but not answering, this question).
102 605 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
103 As the secured person, Gray could not be liable for subrogation, but failed to
raise the issue on appeal. See KRS § 304.39-070(2) (1981).
104 Gray v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 605 S.W.2d at 776.
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menced by the injured party or by seeking reimbursement pur-
suant to KRS section 304.39-030 within sixty days after the claim
was presented to the reparations obligor of the secured tort-
feasor. 10 Because the statute is silent as to the time within which
the reparation obligor must join in the action as a party, the
court of appeals ruled that the subrogated insurer may do so at
any time prior to judgment, so long as the intervention occurs
within the five year period set forth in KRS section 413.120(2).106
3. Interest and Attorney Fees
Several provisions of the MVRA encourage the insurer to
make prompt payment of BRB. Specifically, payments are over-
due if not paid within thirty days after the reparations obligor re-
ceives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of loss realized.107
Overdue payments bear interest at twelve percent per annum,
and if the obligor's delay was without reasonable foundation, the
rate of interest is increased to eighteen percent per annum. 108 In
addition to these penalties, a court may award the claimant a
reasonable attorney's fee if overdue benefits are recovered after a
denial or delay without a reasonable foundation.° 9
In Automobile Club Insurance Co. v. Lainhart, "0 the court
of appeals held that eighteen percent interest and attorney fees
may not be recovered unless the reparations obligee has actually
provided reasonable proof of loss. A mere offer to furnish proof
of loss, if requested, was held not to satisfy the obligee's burden,
and the proof of loss requirement is not waived by the obligor's
denial of the claim.' In addition, the court held that the asser-
tion of a legitimate and bona fide defense by the reparations ob-
ligor constitutes a reasonable foundation for delay, although the
case is ultimately decided against the obligor. 12
In contrast to Lainhart, both an eighteen percent penalty
1o5 Id.
106 Id.
107 KRS § 304.39-210(1) (1981).
1o8 KRS § 304.39-210(2) (1981).
1M KRS § 304.39-220 (1981).
110 609 S.W.2d 692 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
111 Id. at 694.112 Id. at 695.
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and attorney fees were awarded to the reparations obligee in
Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Roberts"3 after
the reparations obligor delayed processing a claim because cer-
tain medical reports were not returned to the insurer. The ob-
ligor had received copies of all outstanding physicians' bills as
well as a complete medical authorization form. The court held
that the injured party had fulfilled his obligation to furnish any
medical reports and that the duty to search out additional reports
or have them prepared fell on the insurer. " 4
4. Subrogation
In Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. v. Kidd,15 the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court ruled that if a reparations obligor fails to
assert its claim for subrogation by joining as a party in an action
commenced by the injured party or fails to seek reimbursement
pursuant to KRS section 304.39-030 sixty days after the claim has
been presented to the reparation obligor of the secured person,
then it may not otherwise recover its BRB payments by way of
equitable subrogation or any judicial policy against double re-
covery. Ordinarily, the reparations obligor will intervene in the
injured party's action, and damages may be awarded for benefits
already paid by the intervenor-insurer to the injured party as
BRB. However, the Court in Kidd held that the insurer is the
real party in interest and the only party that may be awarded
such damages." 6 If, as in Kidd, the insurer does not intervene or
otherwise prosecute its claim for subrogation, its rights are not
reassigned to the injured party. Nevertheless, in Kidd the injured
party was awarded a double recovery, and the Supreme Court
"reluctantly" held that the injured party could keep it.1 7
Is the requirement that the reparation obligor join in an ac-
tion commenced by the injured party satisfied if a reparations
obligor is joined as a party defendant and thereafter participates
in the suit? The Supreme Court answered this question in the af-
113 603 S.W.2d 498 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
114 Id. at 500.
115 602 S.W.2d 416 (Ky. 1980).
116 Id. at 418.
117 Id. at 417. Cf. Hargett v. Dodson, 597 S.W.2d 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
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firmative in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Waldeck."n8 In that case, Emma and James Waldeck were in-
jured in an accident in January, 1976. Their automobile was in-
sured by State Farm, which paid Emma $10,000 in BRB and
$1,440 for damages to her automobile. The company paid James
$1,677.23 in BRB. The Waldecks then sued the tort-feasor,
Frozen Food Express, Inc., which was insured by Excalibur In-
surance Company. The case was settled prior to trial. Excalibur
issued two checks as part of the settlement-one for $1,677.23
payable to State Farm, James Waldeck and the Waldecks' coun-
sel. Another check was made payable to State Farm, Emma
Waldeck and the same attorney for $11,550. State Farm refused
to endorse the checks, claiming that it was entitled to all of the
proceeds of the checks as reimbursement for amounts it had paid
the Waldecks.
The Waldecks moved the trial court to restore their action to
the docket and added State Farm as a defendant so that the court
could adjudicate the respective rights of the parties to the checks.
State Farm answered the Waldecks' amended complaint and
filed a counterclaim for the total of the two checks. The trial
judge awarded the Waldecks' counsel one-third of the total with
accrued interest as attorney fees. The Waldecks received the re-
mainder, less an amount equal to the payment State Farm had
made for Emma's property damage.
The court of appeals reversed that part of the judgment
awarding attorney fees, but affirmed the trial court's refusal to
reimburse State Farm for its BRB payments on the ground that
State Farm had not asserted its right to subrogation by one of the
two exclusive methods provided in KRS section 304.39-070(3).
The Supreme Court reversed, awarding State Farm the entire
amount of the two Excalibur checks, with accrued interest. This
equaled State Farm's payments to the Waldecks for BRB and
property damage. Although the court of appeals correctly held
that KRS section 304.39-070(3) ordinarily establishes the exclu-
sive procedural means by which the reparations obligor can re-
cover BRB previously paid to an injured person from the repara-
tions obligor of a secured person, the Court concluded that it
118 619 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1981).
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would be wasted effort to require State Farm to intervene in an
action in which it already was a party. 1 9 By "joining" and partic-
ipating in the action, State Farm satisfied the procedural require-
ments of the statute.120
In Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Bennett,121 the court of
appeals considered the question of whether an insurance carrier
which had paid BB has a right to recover its payments from the
tort-feasor in an action for indemnity independent of its right of
subrogation under KRS section 304.39-070. The case arose from
a two-car accident involving Floyd Bennett and Lillian Ben-
nett.' Floyd's liability carrier, Fireman's Fund, paid him more
than $9,000 in BRB. He sued Lillian, who had a $10,000 liability
limit on a policy with Government Employees Insurance Com-
pany. Although Floyd's claims exceeded these policy limits, he
settled the claim with Lillian and Government Employees for
$10,000. Prior to settlement, Fireman's Fund had intervened to
assert its subrogation rights. Its claim was dismissed by the trial
court and the court of appeals affirmed based upon KRS section
304.39-070 subsections (3) and (4) and KRS section 304.39-
140(3).
These provisions limit subrogation recovery to the amount of
liability insurance coverage available and also give the injured
party priority to the policy proceeds to the extent that his or her
injuries were not compensated by BRB. The court of appeals
held that the basic reparations obligor could not frustrate settle-
ment by demanding that the issue of damages be submitted to a
jury solely to preserve the obligor's right to subrogation.l12 The
court also rejected the contention of Fireman's Fund that it
should be allowed to recover its reparations payments by way of
"9 Id. at 495.
120 Id. The court distinguished Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kidd, 602 S.W.2d 416,
where the insurer sought to recover BRB in a declaratory judgment action separate and
distinct from the one commenced by the injured person, and Smith v. Earp, 449 F. Supp.
503 (W.D. Ky. 1978), where the insurance company entered into a settlement agreement
with the parties to the tort suit providing for reimbursement of any final award. 619
S.W.2d at 495.
121 28 KLS 11, at 2 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981), discretionary rev. granted, No. 81-SC-630-
DG (Ky. March 26,1981).
12 Lillian Bennett was married to Lawrence Bennett. Id. Their relationship with
Floyd, if any, was not noted in the opinion.
123 Id.
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an action for indemnity, free of the limitations on subrogation
contained in the MVRA. The court held that the purpose of the
MVRA was to provide speedy settlement of claims where dam-
ages do not exceed the threshold.12 The indemnity theory ad-
vanced by Fireman's Fund, the court noted, would open the
door to an indemnity claim for every BRB payment caused by the
negligence of a third party, whether or not the threshold was ex-
ceeded.12 This possibility convinced the court that the method of
subrogation provided for in the MVRA should be exclusive. 128
Attorney fees in a subrogation action was the subject in
Meridian Mutual Insurance Co. v. Walker. z2 Walker, the in-
jured party, collected BRB from Meridian in the amount of
$6,037.76. She then pursued an action against the tortfeasor,
having established the threshold figure required under the
MVRA. 28 Meridian intervened and sought subrogation for the
$6,037.76 it had previously paid Walker. The trial court found
that the involvement of counsel for Meridian was so limited that
any fee for collecting the subrogated amount should be paid to
Walker's counsel. The court of appeals noted that a reasonable
attorney fee is to be granted to "[a]n attorney representing a se-
cured person" in such an action, 28 but agreed with the trial court
that "representation" suggests some participation that influences
the opinion of the lower court. Meridian's counsel had not even
appeared at the hearing on his own motion for a fee award. Ac-
cordingly, the fee award to Walker's counsel was affirmed.
C. Threshold
It has been suggested that the threshold requirements of KRS
section 304.39-060(2) (b)12 0 are often ignored by plaintiffs counsel
124 Id.
125 Id.
12 Cf. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Gayle, 28 KLS 12, at 6 (Ky. Ct. App.
1981) (declining to recognize an implied contract of indemnity).
127 602 S.W.2d 181 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
128 See the text accompanying notes 130-53 infra for a discussion of the threshold re-
quirements which, if met, permit a tort action.
129 602 S.W.2d at 182 (quoting KRS § 304.39-070(5) (1981).
130 The statute exempts a tort-feasor from suit to the extent BRB is available to the
injured party, as well as for "damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish and inconve-
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in a tort action, and that this failure to meet the threshold is an
affirmative defense.' 3' Arguments are persuasive that "a case
should [not] go to trial unless there's something in the record
that... [would] support a jury finding that the threshold has
been exceeded, or economic expenses have exceeded the PIP pay-
ments."13 Although no Kentucky cases directly support this pro-
position, some practical guidance can be gleaned from a series of
decisions involving motions for summary judgment.
In Duncan v. Beck, 1, a husband and wife were injured in an
automobile accident. The plaintiff husband sustained cuts and
bruises on his right knee which left several small scars, and he
also suffered from pain in his neck and back. His wife com-
plained of "pain throughout most of her body."'34 They brought a
tort action, and the defendant moved for summary judgment,
contending that the plaintiffs had not met the requirements of
KRS section 304.39-060(2)(b). The court of appeals affirmed the
grant of a summary judgment for the defendant on this issue,ss
reasoning that since the undisputed evidence of record did not
suggest a permanent injury, it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs
to present some evidence that another exception to KRS section
304.39-060(2)(b) applied."' The court rejected the husband's
contention that some small scars on his knee amounted to "per-
manent disfigurement" within the meaning of the statute.1 37
Similarly, the court of appeals ruled in Higgins v. Searcy3M
that a plaintiff must produce some evidence of permanent injury
nience unless the medical expenses exceed $1,000 or the injuries fall into . . . specifically
enumerated categories." Note, supra note 63, at 496. For a general discussion on the allo-
cation of pleading burdens under no-fault acts, see I. I. SCHERMER, AuTOMOBILE LiAnurry
INSURACE § 6.05 (1981).
131 Presentation to the Office of Continuing Education, University of Kentucky Col-
lege of Law, printed in Savage, View of No Fault from Plaintiffs Bar, REPORT OF SEMNAR
ON No FAULT INsuRANCE 19, 25 (Apr. 14, 1978).
132 Id. PIP refers to personal injury protection, the phrase insurers use interchange-
ably with BRB.
133 553 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
13 4 Id. at 477.
135 The case was reversed and remanded for a trial solely on the issue of property
damages. Id.
137 Id.
137 Id.
138 572 s.W.2d 623 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
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when the record fails to show that medical expenses exceed
$1,000. At the time the defendant filed her motion for summary
judgment, the plaintiff had not been treated for twenty months.
The court held that her action could not pend indefinitely while
she sought medical services for the purpose of accumulating ad-
ditional expenses to meet the threshold unless evidence of per-
manency was offered.139
On the other hand, the defendant has some initial burden of
showing that KRS section 304.39-060(2)(b) has not been met. In
Davis v. Dever,4 0 the trial court entered summary judgment for
the defendant. The plaintiff appealed, contending that he had
sustained a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of med-
ical probability based upon the deposition of his physician, who
testified: "I think it would be a reasonable probability in saying
that it has been going on now for at least two and a half years,
that it's probably-if it hasn't gotten better by then, it's probably
not going to get any better. That's the usual case."' 4'
The court of appeals reversed the judgment for the defen-
dant. Although the court referred to the deposition of the plain-
tiff's physician, it based its decision on the fact that the defen-
dant had not met its initial burden of presenting evidence show-
ing no genuine issue of fact existed as to the permanency of the
plaintiff's injury.' 4 The court held that, in such circumstances,
the plaintiff had no duty to make any showing whatever to de-
feat the motion. 4
A passenger also must meet the threshold requirements of
KRS section 304.39-060(2). In D. & B. Coal Co. v. Farmer,' the
Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that a passenger in a motor
vehicle on the public roadways of this state "uses" a motor
vehicle, although he or she may not be a user within the meaning
13 Id. at 624.
140 617 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
141 Id. at 58.
142 Id.
143 Id. The court pointed out that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment
may file opposing affidavits, but Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03 does not require
him or her to do so. The motion may be denied if the moving party has not sustained his or
her burden under the rule.
144 613 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1981).
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of the present KRS section 304.39-020(15).45 Therefore, a pass-
enger is deemed to have accepted the provisions of the no-fault
statute, including its limitation on tort recovery. 1 46 According to
this logic, defendant is entitled to judgment unless the plaintiff
passenger presents evidence that he or she has rejected the provi-
sions of the MVRA, or has met the statutory threshold set forth in
KRS section 304.39-060(2).
An uninsured motorist who meets the threshold requirements
of KRS section 304.39-060(2) can maintain a tort action under
the ruling of Gussler v. Damron147 despite the fact he or she has
failed to reject the tort limitations of the MVRA. The court of ap-
peals distinguished a line of cases barring an uninsured plaintiff's
tort action'" by noting that the uninsured motorist in those deci-
sions had failed to allege that the threshold had been exceeded. 49
The court noted that other penalties could be applied for the un-
insured motorists's failure to comply with the Act other than the
forfeiture of all tort rights. 50
In Stone v. Montgomery, 15' the Kentucky Court of Appeals
addressed a question left unanswered by Gussler: can an unin-
sured motorist recover medical expenses from the insured tort-
feasor once the MVRA threshold is met?
The uninsured plaintiff satisfied the jury that he had in-
curred $1,509.82 in medical expenses and therefore met the
threshold. The jury awarded him the full amount of these ex-
penses, as well as $10,000 for pain and suffering. The court held
that he was entitled to recover damages over and above the BB
that would be payable to an insured motorist (the $10,000 for
pain and suffering) under the rule set down in Gussler. However,
since the uninsured motorist had not rejected the limitation on
145 "User" formerly was defined in KRS § 304.39-020(14) (1978).
146 KRS § 304.39-060(1) (1981).
147 599 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
148 Probus v. Skies, 569 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Atchison v. Overcast, 563
S.W.2d 736 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Thomas v. Ferguson, 560 S.W.2d 835 (Ky. Ct. App.
1978).
149 Gussler v. Damron, 599 S.W.2d at 777.
150 Id. at 778. An uninsured motorist may have his or her license suspended and be
fined pursuant to KRS § 304.99-060 (1981). In addition, BRB payments will not be re-
coverable. Id.
15 618 S.W.2d 595 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
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his tort rights in writing, pursuant to KRS section 304.39-060(4),
he was deemed to have accepted the provisions of the MVRA
abolishing his right to recover economic losses, including medical
and hospital expenses, that would have been paid to him as BRB
had he been insured. The court also said his right to recover these
items of damage was not restored when he met the threshold. 2
Once the medical expenses threshold is met, the uninsured
motorist may recover noneconomic damages (pain and suffer-
ing), but no damages defined as BRB may be recovered except to
the extent that they exceed the $10,000 minimum personal injury
protection required under the MVRA. 1
152 Id. at 598.
153 Id.
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